Title
On incentives in global wireless communities
Abstract
The wireless community networking paradigm shows great promise in achieving a global status. However, both user participation and support from traditional Internet Service Providers (ISPs) play key roles in creating worldwide coverage; for this end a viable incentive system is essential. In this paper we study the economic interactions between users, ISPs and community providers. Our main contribution is threefold. First, we propose a model of the global wireless community concept as a Stackelberg game of two levels and construct the respective payoff functions of each player. Second, we show how both users and ISPs may fail to join the community in equilibrium. Third, we explore the parameter space of the mechanism designer and show how the technology diffusion process and expected payoffs can be controlled by adjusting roaming prices and revenue shares.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1145/1659029.1659031
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on User-provided networking: challenges and opportunities
Keywords
DocType
Citations 
expected payoff,stackelberg game,community provider,economic interaction,global wireless community networks,incentives,great promise,key role,main contribution,global wireless community concept,global status,network economics,wireless community networking paradigm,game theory,mechanism design,parameter space,wireless communication
Conference
11
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.68
4
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Gergely Biczók132634.75
László Toka2607.58
Attila Vidács3191.98
Tuan A. Trinh4151.81