Title
Penalizing strategic preference manipulation in multi-agent decision making
Abstract
We consider the problem of group decision making where the selection process is based upon a group preference function, obtained by an aggregation of the participating agents individual preference functions. We describe some methods for formulating the group preference from the individual preference functions. We note the possibility of the individual agents strategically manipulating the information they provide, so as to further their own goal of getting their most preferred alternative selected by the group. With this in mind, we suggest ways of modifying the formulation of the group decision functions to discourage strategic manipulation by the participating agents
Year
DOI
Venue
2001
10.1109/91.928736
IEEE T. Fuzzy Systems
Keywords
Field
DocType
group preference function,individual preference function,selection process,group decision,group decision function,multi-agent decision,group preference,preferred alternative,agents individual preference function,strategic preference manipulation,own goal,individual agent,indexing terms,fuzzy set theory,intelligent agent,fuzzy set,intelligent agents,fuzzy sets,multi agent systems,internet,group decision making,decision theory,machine intelligence,collaboration,helium
Intelligent agent,Fuzzy set,Multi-agent system,Decision theory,Artificial intelligence,Mathematics,Group decision-making,The Internet
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
9
3
1063-6706
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
19
1.21
2
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ronald R. Yager1986206.03