Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
A widely used technique for securing computer systems is to execute programs inside protection domains that enforce established security policies. These containers, often referred to as sandboxes, come in a variety of forms. Although current sandboxing techniques have individual strengths, they also have limitations that reduce the scope of their applicability. In this paper we give a detailed analysis of the options available to designers of sandboxing mechanisms. As we discuss the tradeoffs of various design choices, we present a sand-boxing facility that combines the strengths of a wide variety of design alternatives. Our design provides a set of simple yet powerful primitives that serve as a flexible, general-purpose framework for confining untrusted programs. As we present our work, we compare and contrast it with the work of others and give preliminary results. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2002 | USENIX Security Symposium | untrusted code,flexible containment mechanism,security policy,secure computation |
Field | DocType | ISBN |
Sandbox (computer security),Computer security,Computer science,Containment | Conference | 1-931971-00-5 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
34 | 5.40 | 9 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| David S. Peterson | 1 | 34 | 5.40 |
| Matt Bishop | 2 | 34 | 5.74 |
| Raju Pandey | 3 | 511 | 46.49 |