Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
. There exists a Nash equilibrium (ε-Nash equilibrium) for every n-person stochastic game with a finite (countable) state space and finite action sets for the players if the payoff to each
player i is one when the process of states remains in a given set of states G
i and is zero otherwise. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2002 | 10.1007/s001820200092 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Key words: Stochastic game,Nash equilibrium,gambling theory,games of survival. | Welfare economics,Correlated equilibrium,Mathematical economics,Risk dominance,Epsilon-equilibrium,Best response,Equilibrium selection,Symmetric equilibrium,Repeated game,Nash equilibrium,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | Citations |
30 | 4 | 3 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.89 | 0 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Piercesare Secchi | 1 | 70 | 11.12 |
| William D. Sudderth | 2 | 62 | 16.34 |