Abstract | ||
---|---|---|
In this paper, we develop a secure multi-attribute procurement auction, in which a sales item is defined by several attributes
called quality, the buyer is the auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are the bidders. Our goal is to develop
a protocol in which acting honestly is a dominant strategy for sellers and that does not leak the true cost of the sellers,
which is highly classified information that the sellers want to keep private. We first present a Vickrey-type protocol that
can be used for multi-attribute procurement auctions. Next, we show how this protocol can be executed securely.
|
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2005 | 10.1007/11507840_29 | Financial Cryptography |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
procurement auction,multi-attribute procurement auction,vickrey-type protocol,security,sales item,privacy.,vickrey auction,secure multi-attribute procurement auction,privacy | Vickrey auction,Computer science,Computer security,Strategic dominance,Procurement,Forward auction,Reverse auction,Classified information,Bidding,Government | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | ISBN |
3570 | 0302-9743 | 3-540-26656-9 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.39 | 17 |
Authors | ||
2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Koutarou Suzuki | 1 | 518 | 29.57 |
Makoto Yokoo | 2 | 3632 | 421.99 |