Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases). In this work, we propose a new, general way of modelling privacy in players' utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome o has the property that any report of player i would have led to o with approximately the same probability, then o has small privacy cost to player i. We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number n of players increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of n). |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2013 | ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. | value privacy,facility location problem,utility function,general social choice problem,players increase,truthful mechanism,discrete utility,discrete version,small privacy cost,number n,outcome o,modelling privacy,differential privacy,economics,mechanism design,theory,privacy |
DocType | Volume | Issue |
Conference | 4 | 3 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
26 | 1.61 | 20 |
Authors | ||
5 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yiling Chen | 1 | 896 | 84.11 |
| Stephen Chong | 2 | 599 | 30.36 |
| Ian A. Kash | 3 | 393 | 35.84 |
| Tal Moran | 4 | 439 | 25.36 |
| Salil P. Vadhan | 5 | 4676 | 234.84 |