Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We present an experimental study of three school choice mechanisms. The Boston mechanism is influential in practice, while the Gale–Shapley and Top Trading Cycles mechanisms have superior theoretical properties. Consistent with theory, this study indicates a high preference manipulation rate under Boston. As a result, efficiency under Boston is significantly lower than that of the two competing mechanisms in the designed environment. However, contrary to theory, Gale–Shapley outperforms Top Trading Cycles and generates the highest efficiency. Our results suggest that replacing the Boston mechanism with either Gale–Shapley or Top Trading Cycles mechanism might significantly improve efficiency. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2006 | 10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.006 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
C78,C92,D82 | Journal | 127 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0022-0531 | 19 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
2.72 | 3 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yan Chen | 1 | 210 | 29.97 |
| Tayfun Sönmez | 2 | 168 | 40.27 |