Title
Security boundaries in mobile ambients
Abstract
A new notion of security boundary is introduced to model multilevel security policies in the scenario of mobile systems, within Cardelli and Gordon's ''pure'' mobile ambients calculus. Information leakage may be expressed in terms of the possibility for a hostile ambient to access confidential data that are not protected inside a security boundary. A control flow analysis is defined, as a refinement of the Hansen-Jensen-Nielsons's CFA, that allows to properly capture boundary crossings. In this way, direct information leakage may be statically detected.
Year
DOI
Venue
2002
10.1016/S0096-0551(02)00009-7
Comput. Lang.
Keywords
Field
DocType
direct information leakage,static analysis.,hostile ambient,security boundary,confidential data,security,mobile ambients,information leakage,mobile system,static analysis,mobile ambients calculus,control flow analysis,multilevel security policy,boundary crossing
Information leakage,Confidentiality,Computer science,Computer security,Multilevel security,Static analysis,Control flow analysis,Computer security model
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
28
1
Computer Languages, Systems & Structures
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
18
0.75
17
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Chiara Braghin11058.86
Agostino Cortesi279166.19
Riccardo Focardi3122999.99