Abstract | ||
---|---|---|
A new notion of security boundary is introduced to model multilevel security policies in the scenario of mobile systems, within Cardelli and Gordon's ''pure'' mobile ambients calculus. Information leakage may be expressed in terms of the possibility for a hostile ambient to access confidential data that are not protected inside a security boundary. A control flow analysis is defined, as a refinement of the Hansen-Jensen-Nielsons's CFA, that allows to properly capture boundary crossings. In this way, direct information leakage may be statically detected. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2002 | 10.1016/S0096-0551(02)00009-7 | Comput. Lang. |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
direct information leakage,static analysis.,hostile ambient,security boundary,confidential data,security,mobile ambients,information leakage,mobile system,static analysis,mobile ambients calculus,control flow analysis,multilevel security policy,boundary crossing | Information leakage,Confidentiality,Computer science,Computer security,Multilevel security,Static analysis,Control flow analysis,Computer security model | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
28 | 1 | Computer Languages, Systems & Structures |
Citations | PageRank | References |
18 | 0.75 | 17 |
Authors | ||
3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Chiara Braghin | 1 | 105 | 8.86 |
Agostino Cortesi | 2 | 791 | 66.19 |
Riccardo Focardi | 3 | 1229 | 99.99 |