Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
•A connection is made between public service choice and routing games.•Theoretical results are obtained as to the effect of demand and worth of service.•In general a public service system should expect a high price of anarchy.•The above ideas are demonstrated with a large scale real world case study. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2013 | 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.04.003 | European Journal of Operational Research |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Game theory,Queueing theory,Health care,OR in health services | Economic efficiency,Health care,Public economics,Economics,Public policy,Queueing theory,Game theory | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
230 | 1 | 0377-2217 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
4 | 0.44 | 17 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vincent A. Knight | 1 | 37 | 10.00 |
| Paul R. Harper | 2 | 188 | 18.44 |