Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper analyses strategy-proof mechanisms or decision schemes which map profiles of cardinal utility functions to lotteries
over a finite set of outcomes. We provide a new proof of Hylland’s theorem which shows that the only strategy-proof cardinal
decision scheme satisfying a weak unanimity property is the random dictatorship. Our proof technique assumes a framework where
individuals can discern utility differences only if the difference is at least some fixed number which we call the grid size. We also prove a limit random dictatorship result which shows that any sequence of strategy-proof and unanimous decision
schemes defined on a sequence of decreasing grid sizes approaching zero must converge to a random dictatorship. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1007/s00355-006-0152-9 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
satisfiability,publication | Unanimity,Dictatorship,Mathematical economics,Finite set,Grid size,If and only if,Mathematics,Cardinal utility,Grid | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
28 | 1 | 1432-217X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.76 | 3 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bhaskar Dutta | 1 | 214 | 54.87 |
| Hans Peters | 2 | 120 | 30.92 |
| Arunava Sen | 3 | 95 | 17.85 |