Paper Info
Title
Evolutionary Market Agents for Resource Allocation in Decentralised Systems
Abstract
We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers.Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe.Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one.
Year
DOI
Venue
2008
10.1007/978-3-540-87700-4_106
PPSN
Keywords
Field
DocType
load-balancing behaviour,decentralised market,bertrand equilibrium,evolutionary market agents,resource allocation,evolutionary market agent,non-cooperative nash equilibrium,service provider,live market,large decentralised system,reserve price,decentralised systems,self-interested service provider,load balance,nash equilibrium
Mathematical optimization,Bertrand competition,Decentralised system,Reservation price,Computer science,Load balancing (computing),Microeconomics,Service provider,Resource allocation,Nash equilibrium
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
5199
0302-9743
8
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.51
10
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Peter R. Lewis125330.22
Paul Marrow2889.26
Xin Yao314858945.63