Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
. The selectope of a cooperative transferable utility game is the convex hull of the payoff vectors obtained by assigning the
Harsanyi dividends of the coalitions to members determined by so-called selectors. The selectope is studied from a set-theoretic
point of view, as superset of the core and of the Weber set; and from a value-theoretic point of view, as containing weighted
Shapley values, random order values, and sharing values. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2000 | 10.1007/s001820050003 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Key words: Cooperative game,selectope core,Weber set,sharing value | Welfare economics,Subset and superset,Mathematical economics,Dividend,Shapley value,Order values,Convex hull,Transferable utility,Bondareva–Shapley theorem,Mathematics,Stochastic game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
29 | 1 | 0020-7276 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
24 | 10.49 | 2 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jean Derks | 1 | 72 | 22.89 |
| Hans Haller | 2 | 80 | 19.80 |
| Hans Peters | 3 | 39 | 21.55 |