Paper Info
Title
A combinatorial procurement auction featuring bundle price revelation without free-riding
Abstract
Combinatorial auctions are currently becoming a common practice in industrial procurement, allowing bidders (sellers of goods and services in the procurement setting) to avoid the risk of selling good or service bundles that are incomplete, inefficient, or excessively expensive to deliver. Two major concerns in combinatorial auction design are the revelation or discovery of market price information over the course of the auction, and the inherent computational difficulty (NP-hardness) of the underlying ''winner-determination'' problem. In this paper we describe a new general auction format maintaining the benefits of the adaptive user-selection approach without the problems of free-riding, inefficiency, or distortionary linear prices. This auction format is particularly well-suited to the largest combinatorial auctions for which winner-determination is computationally tractable, because it provides bundle synergy information that is computable in polynomial time for all interactive phases.
Year
DOI
Venue
2008
10.1016/j.dss.2007.09.002
Decision Support Systems
Keywords
Field
DocType
auction format,combinatorial auctions,market price information,auction design,largest combinatorial auction,procurement,industrial procurement,procurement setting,iterative auctions,free-riding,bundle price revelation,combinatorial auction design,bundle synergy information,new general auction format,combinatorial auction,combinatorial procurement auction,adaptive user-selection approach,free riding,polynomial time
Mathematical economics,Combinatorial auction,Computer science,Microeconomics,Generalized second-price auction,Auction theory,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Auction algorithm,Reverse auction,Forward auction,Revenue equivalence
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
44
3
Decision Support Systems
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
5
0.53
9
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Robert Day119315.90
S. Raghavan221616.30