Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We introduce a two-person beauty contest game with a unique Nash equilibrium that is identical to the game with many players. However, iterative reasoning is unnecessary in the two-person game as choosing zero is a weakly dominant strategy. Despite this “easier” solution concept, we find that a large majority of players do not choose zero. This is the case even with a sophisticated subject pool. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2008 | 10.1016/j.geb.2007.03.004 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
C7,C9 | Welfare economics,Economics,Mathematical economics,Best response,Equilibrium selection,Repeated game,Solution concept,Normal-form game,Nash equilibrium,Centipede game,Non-cooperative game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
62 | 1 | 0899-8256 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
8 | 1.48 | 1 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brit Grosskopf | 1 | 14 | 3.38 |
| Rosemarie Nagel | 2 | 28 | 4.72 |