Title
The Newsvendor Game Has a Nonempty Core
Abstract
We settle an open conjecture regarding the newsvendor game. We prove that its core is always nonempty for all possible joint distributions of the random demands. We give sufficient conditions under which the core is a singleton, or at a core allocation every newsvendor shares a nonnegative cost. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.
Year
DOI
Venue
2002
10.1006/game.2001.0854
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
Field
DocType
cost allocation,inventory centralization,core
Newsvendor model,Economics,Mathematical economics,Joint probability distribution,Microeconomics,Singleton,Cost allocation,Conjecture
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
38
1
0899-8256
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
42
5.24
2
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Alfred Müller18717.12
Marco Scarsini216433.96
Moshe Shaked314331.05