Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private-monitoring perturbations. We show that with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust if it induces a “regular” 2×2 coordination game in the continuation play. This regularity condition is violated in all belief-free equilibria. Indeed, with an individual full rank condition, every interior belief-free equilibrium is robust. We also analyze block belief-free equilibria and point out that the notion of robustness is sensitive to whether we allow for uninterpretable signals. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2013 | 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.017 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
C72,C73,D82,D83 | Journal | 148 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
5 | 0022-0531 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 6 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Takuo Sugaya | 1 | 0 | 0.68 |
| Satoru Takahashi | 2 | 3 | 1.41 |