Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper, we assess the applicability of auctions based on the Vickrey second price model for allocating wireless spectrum in developing countries. We first provide an overview of auction models for allocating resources. We then examine the experience of auctioning spectrum in different countries. Based on this examination, we posit some axioms that seem to have to be satisfied when allocating spectrum in most developing countries. In light of these axioms, we provide a critical evaluation of using Vickrey second-price auctions to allocate spectrum in developing countries. We suggest the use of a new auction mechanism, the Vickrey "share auction" which will satisfy many of these axioms. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2001 | Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research | spectrum,second price auction,developing country,satisfiability,vickrey auction |
Field | DocType | Volume |
English auction,Economics,Vickrey auction,Mathematical economics,Microeconomics,Generalized second-price auction,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Auction theory,Proxy bid,Spectrum auction,Revenue equivalence | Journal | cs.CY/0109 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| G. Anandalingam | 1 | 457 | 44.41 |
| Robert H. Smith | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |