Title
Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case
Abstract
We study affiliated value second price auctions with two financially constrained bidders. We prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium under quite general conditions. Comparative static results are provided. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.
Year
DOI
Venue
2002
10.1006/game.2001.0896
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
Field
DocType
comparative statics,second price auction
Mathematical economics,Economics,Vickrey auction,Reservation price,Microeconomics,Symmetric equilibrium,Common value auction,Comparative statics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
39
2
0899-8256
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
8
6.53
2
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hanming Fang11711.42
Sérgio O. Parreiras22011.55