Title
Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols.
Abstract
The quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model deterministic and probabilistic systems. By using a methodology generalizing the lattice of information approach we model refined attackers capable to observe the internal behavior of the system, and quantify the information leakage of such systems. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, we show how to use the method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks on the Onion Routing protocol.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1016/j.tcs.2015.07.034
Theoretical Computer Science
Keywords
Field
DocType
Model checking,Quantitative information flow,Information leakage,Markov chain,Markov decision process,Channel capacity,Probabilistic system
Markov process,Information leakage,Lattice (order),Computer science,Markov decision process,Theoretical computer science,Probabilistic logic,Channel capacity,Onion routing,Computation,Distributed computing
Conference
Volume
Issue
ISSN
597
C
0304-3975
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
10
0.52
31
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Fabrizio Biondi1599.33
Axel Legay22982181.47
Pasquale Malacaria397958.80
Andrzej Wasowski4128260.47