Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee that it will be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92 |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2000 | 10.1006/jeth.1999.2573 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
coordination,learning,language,common knowledge | Journal | 90 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0022-0531 | 5 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
5.23 | 1 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Andreas Blume | 1 | 72 | 24.98 |
| Uri Gneezy | 2 | 76 | 39.16 |