Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The literature on assembly systems with random component yields has focused on centralized systems, where a single decision maker chooses all components’ production quantities and incurs all the costs. We consider a decentralized setting where the component suppliers choose their production quantities based solely on their own cost/reward structure, and the assembly firm makes ordering decisions based on its own cost/reward structure. When the suppliers control their inputs but the outputs exhibit random yields, coordination in such systems becomes quite complex. In such situations, incentive alignment control mechanisms are needed so that the suppliers will choose production quantities as in the centralized system case. One such mechanism is to penalize the supplier with the worse delivery performance. We analyze the conditions under which system coordination is achieved while respecting participation constraints. Further, we determine the optimal component ordering policy for the assembly firm and derive the optimal coordinating penalties. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1016/j.ejor.2005.09.036 | European Journal of Operational Research |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Inventory,Game theory,Supply chain coordination | Mathematical optimization,Decentralised system,Delivery Performance,Incentive,Economic order quantity,Operations research,Input/output,Participation constraint,Game theory,Operations management,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
176 | 3 | 0377-2217 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
52 | 7.43 | 4 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Haresh Gurnani | 1 | 174 | 16.90 |
| Yigal Gerchak | 2 | 461 | 93.53 |