Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Peer-to-Peer overlays are responsible for a large amount of consumer traffic, including the costly inter-domain traffic. Managing this traffic requires to consider the interests of the involved parties (users, overlay providers, and network providers), since many traditional approaches benefit only single parties. In this work we propose a mechanism where an Internet provider offers additional free resources to selected users that act in a most network-friendly way and are able to bias the overlay traffic for higher localization. By the means of simulations, we show that a proper cooperation with overlay providers can result in a mutual benefit. For typical interconnection agreements, this also applies if only a single Internet provider adopts the proposed mechanism. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1007/978-3-642-15485-0_2 | ETM |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
mutual benefit,overlay provider,consumer traffic,traffic management,incentive-based approach,internet provider,overlay traffic,peer-to-peer overlay,costly inter-domain traffic,network provider,single internet provider,proposed mechanism | Incentive,Computer security,Network providers,Peer to peer overlay,Computer network,Net neutrality,Overlay,Interconnection,The Internet,Business,Early adopter | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | ISBN |
6236 | 0302-9743 | 3-642-15484-0 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
4 | 0.47 | 9 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Konstantin Pussep | 1 | 195 | 13.86 |
| Sergey Kuleshov | 2 | 4 | 0.47 |
| Christian Groß | 3 | 4 | 0.47 |
| Sergios Soursos | 4 | 69 | 10.43 |