Title
Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES.
Abstract
In this paper, we present improvements of the algebraic side-channel analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) proposed in the works of M. Renauld and F.-X. Standaert. In particular, we optimize the algebraic representation of both the AES block cipher and obtained side-channel information, in the form of Hamming weights of intermediate states, in order to speed up the attack and increase its success rate. We study the performance of our improved attack in both known and unknown plaintext/ciphertext attack scenarios. Our experiments indicate that in both cases the amount of required side-channel information is less than the one required in the attacks introduced earlier. Furthermore, we introduce a method for handling erroneous side-channel information, which allows our improved algebraic side-channel attack (IASCA) to partially escape the assumption of an error-free environment and thus become applicable in practice. We demonstrate the practical use of our IASCA by inserting predictions from a single-trace template attack.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1109/HST.2012.6224335
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Keywords
DocType
Volume
aes,error handling,algebraic representation,estimation,hamming weight,side channel attacks,vectors,advanced encryption standard,cryptography,algebra
Journal
3
Issue
ISSN
ISBN
3
2190-8516
978-1-4673-2341-3
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
18
0.79
16
Authors
6
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Mohamed Saied Emam Mohamed11048.90
Stanislav Bulygin221316.61
Michael Zohner340913.44
Annelie Heuser412017.55
Michael Walter511110.36
Johannes Buchmann658752.67