Abstract | ||
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Recently, strategic behavior modeling has attracted much attention of the researchers focusing on designing protocols in the area of overlay multicast networks. The motivation lies in the fact that the overlay peers are selfish in nature and they typically belong to different administrative domains. In this paper, we model the strategic behavior of the selfish peers by leveraging the rich theory of mechanism design using the concept of economic auctions. By considering the bandwidth of the service offered by the origin server as the commodity, we design dynamic auctions in which downstream peers submit their value of bids for each commodity at the upstream peers. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2011 | 10.1109/ITNG.2011.163 | ITNG |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
strategic behavior,overlay multicast network,mechanism design,auction mechanism,selfish peer,multi-service overlay multicast networks,economic auction,strategic behavior modeling,different administrative domain,downstream peer,overlay peer,dynamic auction,bandwidth,media,bandwidth allocation,integrated circuits,servers,integrated circuit,protocols,resource allocation,multicasting,microeconomics | Bandwidth allocation,Commodity,Computer science,Server,Computer network,Mechanism design,Common value auction,Resource allocation,Overlay multicast,Multicast,Distributed computing | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 7 |
Authors | ||
2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Mohammad Hossein Rezvani | 1 | 40 | 9.06 |
Morteza Analoui | 2 | 124 | 24.94 |