Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Bridging the gap between formal methods and cryptography has recently received a lot of interest, i.e., investigating to what extent proofs of cryptographic protocols made with abstracted cryptographic operations are valid for real implementations. This led to the notion of cryptographically faithful (sound) abstractions. These abstractions allow for a provably secure cryptographic implementation; however their incorporation into machine-aided verification of security protocols has not been properly adressed yet. The panel should serve as an opportunity to discuss the current state-of-the-art in this area of research as well as the suitability of these abstractions for tool-supported verification of cryptographic protocols. We hope that the discussion will shed light on how far both communities are still apart. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2003 | 10.1145/1035429.1035436 | FMSE |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
abstracted cryptographic operation,formal method,cryptographically faithful,relating cryptography,extent proof,provably secure cryptographic implementation,real implementation,tool-supported verification,security protocol,cryptographic protocol,machine-aided verification,security protocols,cryptography,formal methods,provable security | Computational hardness assumption,Cryptographic protocol,Computer science,Cryptography,Theoretical computer science,Cryptographic primitive,Implementation,Mathematical proof,Formal methods,Security of cryptographic hash functions | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
1-58113-781-8 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
37 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Michael Backes | 1 | 2801 | 163.28 |
| Catherine Meadows | 2 | 928 | 89.05 |
| John C. Mitchell | 3 | 6238 | 662.57 |