Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study the notion of informedness in a client-consultant setting. Using a software simulator, we examine the extent to which it pays o for consultants to provide their clients with advice that is well-informed, or with advice that is merely meant to appear to be well-informed. The latter strategy is benecial in that it costs less resources to keep up-to-date, but carries the risk of a decreased reputation if the clients discover the low level of informedness of the consultant. Our experimental results indicate that under dierent circumstances, dierent strategies yield the optimal results (net prot) for the consultants. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2009 | Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research | argumentation,social simulation.,well-informedness,profitability,social simulation |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Actuarial science,Computer science,Net profit,Software simulator,Reputation | Journal | abs/0909.0 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.46 | 6 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eugen Staab | 1 | 63 | 6.75 |
| Martin W. A. Caminada | 2 | 865 | 46.84 |