Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In the problem of judgment aggregation, a panel of judges has to evaluate each proposition in a given agenda as true or false,
based on their individual evaluations and subject to the constraint of logical consistency. We elaborate on the relation between
this and the problem of aggregating abstract binary evaluations. For the special case of truth-functional agendas we have
the following main contributions: (1) a syntactical characterization of agendas for which the analogs of Arrow’s aggregation
conditions force dictatorship; (2) a complete classification of all aggregators that satisfy those conditions; (3) an analysis
of the effect of weakening the Pareto condition to surjectivity. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2009 | 10.1007/s00355-008-0320-1 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
satisfiability | Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Arrow's impossibility theorem,Proposition,Arrow,Logical consistency,Judgment aggregation,Mathematics,Pareto principle,Binary number,Special case | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
32 | 2 | 1432-217X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
9 | 1.11 | 5 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Elad Dokow | 1 | 84 | 9.39 |
| Ron Holzman | 2 | 287 | 43.78 |