Paper Info
Title
How to characterize side-channel leakages more accurately?
Abstract
The effectiveness of side-channel attacks strongly depends on to what extent the underlying leakage model characterizes the physical leakages of cryptographic implementations and on how largely the subsequent distinguisher exploits these leakages. Motivated by this, we propose a compact yet efficient approach to more accurately characterizing side-channel leakages. It is called BitwiseWeighted Characterization (BWC) approach. We use power analysis attacks as illustrative examples and construct two new BWC-based side-channel distinguishers, namely BWC-DPA and BWC-CPA. We present a comparative study of several distinguishers applied to both simulated power traces and real power measurements from an AES microcontroller prototype implementation to demonstrate the validity and the effectiveness of the proposed methods. For example, the number of traces required to perform successful BWC-CPA (resp. BWC-DPA) is only 66% (resp. 49%) of that of CPA (resp. DPA). Our results firmly validate the power and the accuracy of the proposed side-channel leakages characterization approach.
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.1007/978-3-642-21031-0_15
ISPEC
Keywords
Field
DocType
efficient approach,proposed side-channel leakages characterization,power analysis attack,new bwc-based side-channel distinguishers,side-channel attack,side-channel leakage,successful bwc-cpa,simulated power trace,real power measurement,power analysis,side channel attacks
Power analysis,Leakage (electronics),Computer security,Computer science,Exploit,Microcontroller,Side channel attack,Cryptographic implementations
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
6672
0302-9743
3
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.46
11
6
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jiye Liu161.21
YongBin Zhou213627.58
Han Yang350.82
Jiantang Li430.46
Shuguo Yang592.27
Deng-Guo Feng61991190.95