Paper Info
Title
Mechanism design for multi-slot ads auction in sponsored search markets
Abstract
In this paper, we study pricing models for multi-slot advertisements, where advertisers can bid to place links to their sales webpages at one or multiple slots on a webpage, called the multi-slot AD auction problem. We develop and analyze several important mechanisms, including the VCG mechanism for multi-slot ads auction, the optimal social welfare solution, as well as two weighted GSP-like protocols (mixed and hybrid). Furthermore, we consider that forward-looking Nash equilibrium and prove its existence in the weighted GSP-like pricing protocols. We prove properties and compare revenue of those different pricing models via analysis and simulation.
Year
DOI
Venue
2010
10.1007/978-3-642-14553-7_4
FAW
Keywords
Field
DocType
mechanism design,weighted gsp-like pricing protocol,different pricing model,important mechanism,forward-looking nash equilibrium,vcg mechanism,multi-slot ads auction,multiple slot,search market,multi-slot ad auction problem,weighted gsp-like protocol,multi-slot advertisement,social welfare,nash equilibrium
Vickrey auction,Economics,Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Generalized second-price auction,Auction theory,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Reverse auction,Revenue equivalence,Auction algorithm,Double auction
Conference
Volume
ISSN
ISBN
6213
0302-9743
3-642-14552-3
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
7
0.53
5
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Xiaotie Deng13887340.99
Yang Sun24615.21
Yin Ming311423.30
Yunhong Zhou4161.59