Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS*) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS* is always a well-defined order independent procedure that can be used to solve Nash equilibrium in dominance-solvable games. We characterize IESDS* by means of a “stability” criterion, and offer a sufficient and necessary epistemic condition for IESDS*. We show by an example that IESDS* may generate spurious Nash equilibria in the class of Reny's better-reply secure games. We provide sufficient/necessary conditions under which IESDS* preserves the set of Nash equilibria. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.002 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
C70,C72 | Mathematical economics,Epsilon-equilibrium,Risk dominance,Best response,Game theory,Nash equilibrium,Iterated function,Mathematics,Stochastic game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
61 | 2 | 0899-8256 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
11 | 1.07 | 2 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yi-Chun Chen | 1 | 16 | 3.80 |
| Ngo Van Long | 2 | 31 | 8.71 |
| Xiao Luo | 3 | 11 | 1.07 |