Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In view of the recent regulatory trend that the incumbent is mandated to provide its own bottleneck facilities to entrants when requested, it is more reasonable to take an entrant than the incumbent as the one who plays a leader role. Given this regulatory framework, the present paper examines under what conditions the ECPR or marginal cost pricing is socially optimal. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2001 | 10.1016/S0167-6245(01)00037-3 | Information Economics and Policy |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Interconnection obligation,Stackelberg leader,Capacity expansion,Optimal access pricing | Bottleneck,Economics,Obligation,Microeconomics,Marginal cost,Average cost pricing,Industrial organization,Interconnection | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
13 | 3 | 0167-6245 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ji-ho Joo | 1 | 1 | 1.39 |
| Hyeon-Mo Ku | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Jaecheol Kim | 3 | 70 | 7.59 |