Abstract | ||
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Abstract In P2P networks, there are no incentives to cooperate There is neither a reward for coop - eration nor a punishment for non - cooperation A distributed reputation system could solve this problem, by giving means of managing trust towards other entities and discovering vicious en - tities The existing distributed reputation systems are based on plausibility considerations and, thus, have several limitations Therefore, in this report, we aim at overcoming these limitations by proposing the Buddy System as a distributed reputation system that is based on social struc - ture For this purpose, we discuss the design space of social structures and choose an appropriate social structure for the Buddy System We consider implementation issues for its social structure by taking into account the volatility of the P2P network Finally, we show by the means of simulation that the Buddy System significantly improves the e?ectiveness and e±ciency of con - ventional distributed reputation systems More specifically, the Buddy System is more e?ective in the detection of vicious entities and does not introduce any additional communication overhead |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
---|---|---|
2004 | GI-Jahrestagung | social structure |
Field | DocType | Citations |
Design space,Buddy system,Political science,Reputation system,Incentive,Computer security,Social structure,Reputation | Conference | 8 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
1.36 | 9 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Stefan Fähnrich | 1 | 12 | 1.89 |
Philipp Obreiter | 2 | 105 | 14.75 |
Birgitta König-Ries | 3 | 595 | 106.09 |