Paper Info
Title
Applying Bargaining Game Theory to Web Services Negotiation
Abstract
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) have obvious value for Service-Oriented Computing and have received attention from both academics and industry. However, SLAs still lack a theoretical basis and effective techniques to facilitate automatic SLA establishment. In this paper, we classify negotiations into four types, and focus on the 1-to-1 Web services negotiation between a single service provider and a single service consumer. We make three contributions. Firstly, we represent the 1-to-1 Web services negotiation as a bargaining game. Here, we are interested in a bargain that takes into account the interests of both a service provider and a service consumer, in other words, a fair solution. Secondly, we determine a Nash equilibrium that can be regarded as the fair solution to a two-player bargaining game. We also determine the fair solution to the 1-to-1 Web services negotiation. Finally, we discuss issues that may arise with the 1-to-1 Web services negotiation under credible threats, incomplete information, time constraints, and multiple attributes.
Year
DOI
Venue
2010
10.1109/SCC.2010.54
IEEE SCC
Keywords
Field
DocType
two-player bargaining game,fair solution,bargaining game,web services,nash equilibrium,1-to-1 web services negotiation,service-oriented computing,game theory,service provider,service consumer,single service consumer,bargaining game theory,single service provider,sla establishment,web services negotiation,service level agreements,service oriented computing,web service,quality of service,games,incomplete information
Service level,Computer science,Knowledge management,Service provider,Game theory,Web service,Nash equilibrium,Service delivery framework,Service-oriented architecture,Negotiation
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
978-0-7695-4126-6
26
1.54
References 
Authors
8
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Xianrong Zheng11378.58
Patrick Martin219523.58
Wendy Powley332928.43
Kathryn Brohman4775.62