Title
Single parameter FPT-algorithms for non-trivial games
Abstract
We know that k-UNIFORM NASH is W[2]-Complete when we consider imitation symmetric win-lose games (with k as the parameter) even when we have two players. However, this paper provides positive results regarding Nash equilibria. We show that consideration of sparse games or limitations of the support result in fixed-parameter algorithms with respect to one parameter only for the k-Uniform Nash problem. That is, we show that a sample uniform Nash equilibrium in r-sparse imitation symmetric win-lose games is not as hard because it can be found in FPT time (i.e polynomial in the size of the game, but maybe exponential in r). Moreover, we show that, although NP-Complete, the problem of BEST NASH EQUILIBRIUM is also fix-parameter tractable.
Year
Venue
Keywords
2010
IWOCA
sample uniform nash equilibrium,nash equilibrium,fix-parameter tractable,fpt time,imitation symmetric win-lose game,r-sparse imitation symmetric win-lose,best nash equilibrium,non-trivial game,k-uniform nash problem,fixed-parameter algorithm,k-uniform nash,single parameter fpt-algorithms,nash equilibria,algorithmic game theory,computational complexity
DocType
Volume
ISSN
Conference
6460
0302-9743
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
3
0.38
6
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
vladimir estivillcastro1903107.50
Mahdi Parsa2141.70