Title
Information-Theoretic Advisors in Invisible Chess.
Abstract
Making decisions under uncertainty remains a cen- tral problem in AI research. Unfortunately, most uncertain real-world problems are so complex that progress in them is extremely difficult. Games model some elements of the real world, and offer a more controlled environment for exploring meth- ods for dealing with uncertainty. Chess and chess- like games have long been used as a strategical- ly complex test-bed for general AI research, and we extend that tradition by introducing an imper- fect information variant of chess with some useful properties such as the ability to scale the amount of uncertainty in the game. We discuss the complex- ity of this game which we call invisible chess, and present results outlining the basic game. We mo- tivate and describe the implementation and appli- cation of two information-theoretic advisors, and describe our decision-theoretic approach to com- bining these information-theoretic advisors with a basic strategic advisor. Finally we discuss promis- ing preliminary results that we have obtained with these advisors.
Year
Venue
DocType
2001
AISTATS
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
3
0.49
8
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
A. E. Bud130.49
David Albrecht235636.66
Ann E. Nicholson369288.01
I. Zukerman4123.29