Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Two-Player Perfect-Information Shift-Invariant Submixing Stochastic Games Are Half-Positional. |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a payoff function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the the payoff function is both shift-invariant and submixing, then the game is half-positional, i.e. the first player has an optimal strategy which is both deterministic and stationary. This result relies on the existence of $\epsilon$-subgame-perfect equilibria in shift-invariant games, a second contribution of the paper. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2014 | CoRR | Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Sequence,Repeated game,Invariant (mathematics),Perfect information,Real number,Mathematics,Stochastic game |
DocType | Volume | Citations |
Journal | abs/1401.6575 | 3 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.38 | 10 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hugo Gimbert | 1 | 249 | 21.31 |
| Edon Kelmendi | 2 | 20 | 5.34 |