Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Port knocking is a technique to prevent attackers from discovering and exploiting vulnerable network services, while allowing access for authenticated users. Unfortunately, most work in this area suffers from a lack of a clear threat model or motivation. To remedy this, we introduce a formal security model for port knocking, show how previous schemes fail to meet our definition, and give a provably secure scheme. We also present Silent Knock, an implementation of this protocol that is provably secure under the assumption that AES and a modified version of MD4 are pseudorandom functions, and integrates seamlessly with existing applications. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2009 | 10.1007/s10207-008-0070-1 | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INFORMATION SECURITY |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Provable security, Cryptography, Formal models, Covert authentication | Journal | 8 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
2 | 1615-5262 | 2 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.42 | 7 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eugene Y. Vasserman | 1 | 311 | 20.85 |
| Nicholas Hopper | 2 | 1469 | 95.76 |
| James Tyra | 3 | 108 | 5.89 |