Title
Cryptanalysis of a type of CRT-based RSA algorithms
Abstract
It is well known that the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) can greatly improve the performances of RSA cryptosystem in both running times and memory requirements. However, if the implementation of CRT-based RSA is careless, an attacker can reveal some secret information by exploiting hardware fault cryptanalysis. In this paper, we present some fault attacks on a type of CRT-RSA algorithms namely BOS type schemes including the original BOS scheme proposed by Blömer, Otto, and Seifert at CCS 2003 and its modified scheme proposed by Liu et al. at DASC 2006. We first demonstrate that if some special signed messages such as m = 0, ±1 are dealt carelessly, they can be exploited by an adversary to completely break the security of both the BOS scheme and Liu et al.'s scheme. Then we present a new permanent fault attack on the BOS scheme with a success probability about 25%. Lastly, we propose a polynomial time attack on Liu et al.'s CRT-RSA algorithm, which combines physical fault injection and lattice reduction techniques when the public exponent is short.
Year
DOI
Venue
2008
10.1007/s11390-008-9123-1
J. Comput. Sci. Technol.
Keywords
Field
DocType
modified scheme,cryptanalysis,physical fault injection,crt-based rsa algorithm,original bos scheme,hardware fault cryptanalysis,rsa,fault attack,bos type scheme,bos scheme,chinese remainder theorem,crt-rsa algorithm,crt-based rsa,lll,new permanent fault attack,polynomial time,lattice reduction
Computer science,Chinese remainder theorem,Cryptanalysis,Algorithm,Cryptosystem,Time complexity,Fault attack,Lattice reduction,Fault injection
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
23
2
1860-4749
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.35
15
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Baodong Qin119019.40
Ming Li231.44
Fan-Yu Kong330.72