Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We examine the problem of building or fortifying a network to defend against enemy attacks in various scenarios. In particular, we examine the case in which an enemy can destroy any portion of any arc that a designer constructs on the network, subject to some interdiction budget. This problem takes the form of a three-level, two-player game, in which the designer acts first to construct a network and transmit an initial set of flows through the network. The enemy acts next to destroy a set of constructed arcs in the designer's network, and the designer acts last to transmit a final set of flows in the network. Most studies of this nature assume that the enemy will act optimally; however, in real-world scenarios one cannot necessarily assume rationality on the part of the enemy. Hence, we prescribe optimal network design algorithms for three different profiles of enemy action: an enemy destroying arcs based on capacities, based on initial flows, or acting optimally to minimize our maximum profits obtained from transmitting flows. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1007/s10898-006-9067-3 | J. Global Optimization |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Network design,Integer programming,Network interdiction,Game theory | Mathematical optimization,Heuristic,Rationality,Network planning and design,Interdiction,Integer programming,Game theory,Adversary,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
38 | 2 | 0925-5001 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
23 | 1.37 | 18 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| J. Cole Smith | 1 | 610 | 43.34 |
| Churlzu Lim | 2 | 83 | 6.63 |
| Fransisca Sudargho | 3 | 23 | 1.37 |