Title
Identification Protocols Secure against Reset Attacks
Abstract
We provide identification protocols that are secure even when the adversary can reset the internal state and/or randomization source of the user identifying itself, and when executed in an asynchronous environment like the Internet that gives the adversary concurrent access to instances of the user. These protocols are suitable for use by devices (like smartcards) which when under adversary control may not be able to reliably maintain their internal state between invocations.
Year
DOI
Venue
2001
10.1007/3-540-44987-6_30
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Keywords
DocType
Volume
identication,reset attacks,identification protocols secure,identification protocol,randomization source,adversary control,asynchronous environment,internal state,adversary concurrent access,smartcard
Conference
2000
ISSN
ISBN
Citations 
0302-9743
3-540-42070-3
49
PageRank 
References 
Authors
2.36
28
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Mihir Bellare1164371481.16
Marc Fischlin2170992.71
Shafi Goldwasser399352069.05
Silvio Micali4114342581.31