Paper Info
Title
The Core and Nucleolus in a Model of Information Transferal.
Abstract
Galdeano et al. introduced the so-called information market game involving n identical firms acquiring a new technology owned by an innovator. For this specific cooperative game, the nucleolus is determined through a characterization of the symmetrical part of the core. The nonemptiness of the (symmetrical) core is shown to be equivalent to one of each, super additivity, zero-monotonicity, or monotonicity.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1155/2012/379848
JOURNAL OF APPLIED MATHEMATICS
Field
DocType
Volume
Monotonic function,Mathematical economics,Innovator,Information market,Mathematics
Journal
2012
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
1110-757X
0
0.34
References 
Authors
2
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Dongshuang Hou1116.27
Theo S. H. Driessen24911.00