Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper we combine two different economically inspired mechanisms, acting at intersection and at network level, respectively, to accommodate driver preferences in reservation-based urban traffic management. At intersection level, intersection manager agents assign space-time chunks through combinatorial auctions, while at network level a pricing scheme, based on general market equilibrium, accounts for an efficient use of network resources. Our experiments show that this combined approach on the one hand allows drivers to effectively improve their travel times if they are willing to pay more money for their trip, while on the other hand the negative impact on social welfare (average travel times) is unnoticeable. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.5555/1838206.1838391 | AAMAS |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
intersection level,travel time,network level,driver preference,average travel time,reservation-based urban traffic management,efficient use,combined approach,combinatorial auction,intersection manager agent,network resource,traffic management,combinatorial auctions | Reservation,Network level,Resource (disambiguation),Simulation,Computer science,Combinatorial auction,Operations research,Social Welfare,Distributed computing | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 5 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Matteo Vasirani | 1 | 293 | 28.75 |
| Sascha Ossowski | 2 | 1646 | 158.02 |