Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this work, we build upon previous results to strengthen the equilibrium concept for rational multiparty computation. We consider only rational players, acting to maximize their utility functions. We consider extensive form dynamic games of imperfect information, using a computational variant of perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept. We argue that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a more appropriate solution concept for multiparty computation, as in cryptographic protocols information is often imperfect by design. Further, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept is able to address dynamic games, where players move sequentially rather than simultaneously. By considering players that move sequentially, we are able to remove the assumption of a broadcast channel. Finally, we give novel definitions of privacy, correctness and fairness solely in terms of game theoretic constructs. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2013 | 10.1007/978-3-319-02786-9_14 | GameSec |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
non-cooperative computation,perfect bayesian equilibrium,rational multiparty computation,rational secret sharing | Sequential equilibrium,Correctness,Markov perfect equilibrium,Theoretical computer science,Equilibrium selection,Solution concept,Bayesian game,Perfect information,Mathematics,Extensive-form game | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.35 | 24 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| John Ross Wallrabenstein | 1 | 12 | 2.20 |
| Chris Clifton | 2 | 3327 | 544.44 |