Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Side-channel attacks are a realistic threat to the security of real world implementations of cryptographic algorithms. In order to evaluate the resistance of designs against power analysis attacks, power values obtained from circuit simulations in early design phases offer two distinct advantages: First, they offer fast feedback loops to designers, second the number of redesigns can be reduced. This work investigates the accuracy of design time power estimation tools in assessing the security level of a device against differential power attacks. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1109/DSD.2011.103 | DSD |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
distinct advantage,power attacks,fast feedback loop,security level,power analysis attack,differential power attack,design time evaluation,side-channel attack,design time power estimation,early design phase,circuit simulation,cryptographic algorithm,side channel attacks,cryptography,semiconductor devices,encryption,integrated circuit,power analysis,correlation | Power analysis,Security level,Computer science,Cryptography,Implementation,Real-time computing,Encryption,Side channel attack | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.42 | 3 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alessandro Barenghi | 1 | 499 | 46.79 |
| Guido Bertoni | 2 | 696 | 41.77 |
| Fabrizio De Santis | 3 | 84 | 10.44 |
| Filippo Melzani | 4 | 13 | 3.71 |