Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the possibilities for cooperation between the players are restricted because communication between the players is restricted. The bilateral communication possibilities are modeled by means of a (communication) graph. We are interested in how the communication restrictions influence the game. In particular, we investigate what conditions on the communication graph guarantee that certain appealing properties of the original game are inherited by the graph-restricted game, the game that arises once the communication restrictions are taken into account. We study inheritance of the following properties: average convexity, inclusion of the Shapley value in the core, inclusion of the Shapley values of a game and all its subgames in the corresponding cores, existence of a population monotonic allocation scheme, and the property that the extended Shapley value is a population monotonic allocation scheme. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2000 | 10.1007/s001820000039 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
JEL classification: C71.,Key words: communication situations,properties,inheritance | Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Shapley value,Repeated game,Screening game,Sequential game,Bondareva–Shapley theorem,Non-cooperative game,Example of a game without a value,Mathematics,Stochastic game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
29 | 2 | 0020-7276 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.39 | 0 |
Authors | ||
1 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Marco Slikker | 1 | 191 | 46.31 |