Title
Attacking Group Multicast Key Management Protocols Using Coral
Abstract
This paper describes the modelling of a two multicast group key management protocols in a firstorder inductive model, and the discovery of previously unknown attacks on them by the automated inductive counterexample finder Coral. These kinds of protocols had not been analysed in a scenario with an active intruder before. Coral proved to be a suitable tool for a job because, unlike most automated tools for discovering attacks, it deals directly with an open-ended model where the number of agents and the roles they play are unbounded. Additionally, Coral's model allows us to reason explicitly about lists of terms in a message, which proved to be essential for modelling the second protocol. In the course of the case studies, we also discuss other issues surrounding multicast protocol analysis, including identifying the goals of the protocol with respect to the intended trust model, modelling of the control conditions, which are considerably more complex than for standard two and three party protocols, and effective searching of the state space generated by the model, which has a much larger branching rate than for standard protocols.
Year
DOI
Venue
2005
10.1016/j.entcs.2004.05.023
Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci.
Keywords
Field
DocType
standard protocol,party protocol,active intruder,security protocol analysis,firstorder inductive model,intended trust model,attacking group multicast key,multicast protocol analysis,open-ended model,multicast group key management,case study,automated tool,group multicast key management,first order,state space,protocol analysis,key management
Inter-domain,Key management,Protocol analysis,Computer science,Counterexample,Multicast,State space,Session key,Branching (version control),Distributed computing
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
125
1
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
7
0.48
19
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Graham Steel151528.04
A. Bundy23713532.03