Title
Inefficiency of Games with Social Context.
Abstract
The study of other-regarding player behavior such as altruism and spite in games has recently received quite some attention in the algorithmic game theory literature. Already for very simple models, it has been shown that altruistic behavior can actually be harmful for society in the sense that the price of anarchy may increase as the players become more altruistic. In this paper, we study the severity of this phenomenon for more realistic settings in which there is a complex underlying social structure, causing the players to direct their altruistic and spiteful behavior in a refined player-specific sense (depending, for example, on friendships that exist among the players). Our findings show that the increase in the price of anarchy is modest for congestion games and minsum scheduling games, whereas it might be drastic for generalized second price auctions.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1007/s00224-014-9602-4
Theory of Computing Systems \/ Mathematical Systems Theory
Keywords
Field
DocType
Strategy Profile,Altruistic Behavior,Price Auction,Delay Function,Congestion Game
Discrete mathematics,Mathematical economics,Congestion game,Altruism,Price of stability,Microeconomics,Inefficiency,Algorithmic game theory,Common value auction,Price of anarchy,Mathematics,Spite
Conference
Volume
Issue
ISSN
57
3
1432-4350
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.37
31
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Aris Anagnostopoulos1105467.08
Luca Becchetti294555.75
Bart de Keijzer311713.52
Guido Schäfer41118.90