Title
Verifying a secure information flow analyzer
Abstract
Denotational semantics for a substantial fragment of Java is formalized by deep embedding in PVS, making extensive use of dependent types. A static analyzer for secure information flow for this language is proved correct, that is, it enforces noninterference.
Year
DOI
Venue
2005
10.1007/11541868_14
TPHOLs
Keywords
Field
DocType
secure information flow,extensive use,denotational semantics,secure information flow analyzer,substantial fragment,static analyzer,deep embedding,dependent type,dependent types
Programming language,Embedding,Semantic domain,Computer science,Denotational semantics,Automated theorem proving,Static analysis,Proof theory,Algorithm,Theoretical computer science,Java,Proof assistant
Conference
Volume
ISSN
ISBN
3603
0302-9743
3-540-28372-2
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
10
0.68
13
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
David Naumann1110184.12