Title
Acoustic side-channel attacks on printers
Abstract
We examine the problemof acoustic emanations of printers. We present a novel attack that recovers what a dot-matrix printer processing English text is printing based on a record of the sound it makes, if the microphone is close enough to the printer. In our experiments, the attack recovers up to 72 % of printed words, and up to 95 % if we assume contextual knowledge about the text, with a microphone at a distance of 10cmfrom the printer. After an upfront training phase, the attack is fully automated and uses a combination of machine learning, audio processing, and speech recognition techniques, including spectrum features, Hidden Markov Models and linear classification; moreover, it allows for feedback-based incremental learning. We evaluate the effectiveness of countermeasures, and we describe how we successfully mounted the attack in-field (with appropriate privacy protections) in a doctor's practice to recover the content of medical prescriptions.
Year
Venue
Keywords
2010
USENIX Security Symposium
hidden markov models,english text,feedback-based incremental learning,acoustic side-channel attack,appropriate privacy protection,machine learning,novel attack,contextual knowledge,audio processing,dot-matrix printer,attack in-field,side channel attacks
Field
DocType
Citations 
Computer security,Computer science,Incremental learning,Speech recognition,Side channel attack,Audio signal processing,Linear classifier,Hidden Markov model,Microphone
Conference
46
PageRank 
References 
Authors
2.51
18
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Michael Backes12801163.28
Markus Dürmuth242325.28
Sebastian Gerling318310.12
Manfred Pinkal4111669.77
Caroline Sporleder545331.84