Title
Verifying and Fixing Password Authentication Protocol
Abstract
Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) is widely used in the Wireless Fidelity Point-to-Point Protocol to authenticate an identity and password for a peer. This paper uses a new knowledge-based framework to verify the PAP protocol and a fixed version. Flaws are found in both the original and the fixed versions. A new enhanced protocol is provided and the security of it is proved. The whole process is implemented in a mechanical reasoning platform, Isabelle. It only takes a few seconds to find flaws in the original and the fixed protocol and to verify that the enhanced version of the PAP protocol is secure.
Year
DOI
Venue
2006
10.1109/SNPD-SAWN.2006.77
SNPD
Keywords
Field
DocType
knowledge based systems,password authentication protocol,protocols,computer networks,mobile computing,message authentication,information security,password authentication,wireless application protocol,wireless networks,mobile communication,wireless communication,knowledge base,authentication
Wide Mouth Frog protocol,Zero-knowledge password proof,Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol,Computer science,Computer security,Otway–Rees protocol,Computer network,S/KEY,Authentication protocol,Password,Reflection attack,Distributed computing
Conference
Volume
Issue
ISBN
2006
null
0-7695-2611-X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.36
5
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Xiaoqi Ma1134.29
Rachel McCrindle2104.34
Xiaochun Cheng3143.10